2011 AAAI J. Hawkin, R. Holte and D. Szafron, Automated Action Abstraction of Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games, Proceedings of Twenty-Fifth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'11), San Francisco, USA, August, 2011, 681-687. abstract or pdf.

Multi-agent decision problems can often be formulated as extensive-form games. We focus on imperfect information extensive-form games in which one or more actions at many decision points have an associated continuous or manyvalued parameter. A stock trading agent, in addition to deciding whether to buy or not, must decide how much to buy. In no-limit poker, in addition to selecting a probability for each action, the agent must decide how much to bet for each betting action. Selecting values for these parameters makes these games extremely large. Two-player no-limit Texas Hold'em poker with stacks of 500 big blinds has approximately 1071 states, which is more than 1050 times more states than twoplayer limit Texas Hold'em. The main contribution of this paper is a technique that abstracts a game's action space by selecting one, or a small number, of the many values for each parameter. We show that strategies computed using this new algorithm for no-limit Leduc poker exhibit significant utility gains over -Nash equilibrium strategies computed with standard, hand-crafted parameter value abstractions..