



The Economist's View of Combinatorial Games

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Overview

- Combinatorial Game Theory
- Goal and Motivation
- Economic Rules and Sentestrat
- Komaster and Extending Thermographs
- Approximations and Forecasting



Combinatorial Game Theory (CGT)

Game assumptions:

- Two players (Left and Right) alternate turns
- Finite
- No elements of chance
- No hidden information
- No draws, ties
- Normal play: last player with legal move wins



CGT Motivation

- Determining the value of a game under optimal play
- Determining the value of different moves
- Solving the sum of independent subgames



Game Notation

Game $G = \{G^L | G^R\}$

- Game defined by Left and Right options
- Positive values favour Left, negative favour Right
- Zero is second-player win, fuzzy is first-player win



Extension of Numbers

Numeric games: $G^L < G < G^R$

- $0 = \{|\}$, any second-player win is equivalent
- $1 = \{0|\}$, \dots , $n = \{n-1|\}$
- $-G = \{-G^R | -G^L\}$, reverse roles
- $\{0|1\} = 1/2$, $\{0|1/2\} = 1/4, \dots$



Non-Numeric Values

- $*$ = $\{0|0\}$, simplest fuzzy game
- $\uparrow = \{0|*\}$, $\downarrow = -\uparrow$
- $\pm x = \{x| -x\}$ (switches)



Further Concepts

Sums of Independent Subgames:


$$G = \{G^L | G^R\}, H = \{H^L | H^R\} \Rightarrow \\ G + H = \{G^L + H, G + H^L | G^R + H, G + H^R\}$$

Incentives:

$$\Delta^L(G) = G^L - G$$

$$\Delta^R(G) = G - G^R$$

Thermographs





Motivation for New Approach

Goal: Extend computation of thermographs to handle positions containing kos

- Game positions no longer form a DAG
- Will not deal with interdependent kos (i.e. triple ko)



Economist's Rules

Initial Setup:

- Bid for roles in each subgame
- Bid for privilege of first move
- Taxation - payment to opponent for making move

Player's Move:

- Pay and Play, or
- Pass



Economist's Rules

Game Transitions:

- Both pass \Rightarrow New bid on taxation (must decrease)
- Higher bid plays next, alternate if tie
- Game ends when neither willing to bid $\geq t_{min}$
- Zero-sum game, wealth determines victory



Sentestrat

Bidding:

- Use mean for Left player bid
- Use temperature for tax/first move bid

Playing:

- If opponent increases temp, respond locally
- If $\text{temp} \geq \text{tax}$, play in subgame of max temp
- If $\text{temp} < \text{tax}$, pass



Sentestrat Analysis



- If both players use Sentestrat, then bids always tie and play alternates
- Theorem: Sentestrat is optimal under Economist's Rules



Subzero Temperatures

- $t_{min} = -1$, opponent pays you to play
- Mathematized go rules: groups become immortal, fill-in own territory

Sample Game





Initial Bids:

Player 1: pays 2 to play
Black in Go

Player 1: pays 1 to play
Vertical in Domineering



Player 2: pays $3/2$ to
play first

Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	$2 \frac{1}{32}$	$1 \frac{15}{32}$
Dom	$\frac{3}{4}$	$1 \frac{1}{8}$

Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	9/16	1 1/16
Dom	3/4	1 1/8


Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	9/16	1 1/16
Dom	1 7/8	1 1/8




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	9/16	1 1/16
Dom	11/16	1 3/16




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
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Go	9/16	1 1/16
Dom	1 7/8	1 1/8




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	9/16	1 1/16
Dom	3/4	1




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	$1 \frac{5}{8}$	$\frac{7}{8}$
Dom	$\frac{3}{4}$	1




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	$1 \frac{5}{8}$	$\frac{7}{8}$
Dom	$-\frac{1}{4}$	1




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	$1 \frac{5}{8}$	$\frac{7}{8}$
Dom	$\frac{7}{8}$	$1 \frac{1}{8}$




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	$1 \frac{5}{8}$	$\frac{7}{8}$
Dom	$-\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	$2 \frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Dom	$-\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	$2 \frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Dom	-1	$-\frac{1}{2}$




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	3	0
Dom	-1	-1/2




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	3	0
Dom	-1	-1/2




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	3	-1
Dom	-1	-1/2





Sample Game



Game	Mean	Temp
Go	3	-1
Dom	-1/2	-1/2




Sample Game




Game	Mean	Temp
Go	3	-1
Dom	-1	-1



Sample Game



Game	Mean	Temp
Go	3	-1
Dom	0	-1



Sample Game



Game	Mean	Temp
Go	3	-1
Dom	-1	-1



Thermography

Classical:

- No loops (i.e. kos)
- Hill region at bottom, infinite mast at top

Goal: Extend to simple kos



Economist Ko Rules

- Komaster is player who will win ko fight (if chooses to play it)
- Repeat positions not disallowed, but is **critical ko** if Komaster causes repeat
- Immediately after creating a critical ko, the Komaster is forced to play a local move

Results:

- Komaster is forced to win ko fight if plays it
- This is never disadvantageous



Computing the Thermograph

Left and Right Scaffolds:

- LS $G_t = -t + \max_{G^L}(\text{Right wall of } G_t^L)$
- RS $G_t = +t + \min_{G^L}(\text{Left wall of } G_t^R)$

Left and Right Walls:



- If $LS \geq RS$ (hill region), same as scaffolds
- If $LS < RS$ (cave region), $LW = RW = \text{mast}$
- Intermediate masts may not be vertical



Thermograph Properties

- Initial temperature
- Active/Dormant
- Activation temperature

Computing Ko Thermographs






- $G = \{V|W, H\},$
 $H = \{G, X|Y\}$

- $\tilde{G} = \{V|W\},$
 $\hat{H} = \{\tilde{G}, X|Y\},$
 $\hat{G} = \{V|W, \hat{H}\}$

- Creates a DAG based on who is Komaster

Thousand-Year Ko





More Thermograph Construction

- Given thermographs for A and B , can construct thermograph for $\{A|B\}$
- Given thermographs for A and B , cannot construct thermograph for $A + B$
- Means (infinite masts) add
- Many positions not relevant, top-down computation may be better



Position Stability

- Stable: ancestors have higher temperatures
- Unstable: some ancestor has a lower temperature
- Semi-stable: some ancestor has same temperature, none have lower

Tradeoff:

- Handling semi-stable as stable is simpler and more efficient
- Handling it as unstable allows more precise calculation of infinitesimal values





Position Frequency

Given n copies of a position, as $n \rightarrow \infty$:

- Mainline: position appears infinite number of times
- Sideline: position frequency is bounded

Mainline positions provide a good approximation of the game value in rich environments

Mainline/Sideline Example





Other Strategies

- Hotstrat - pick subgame with maximum temperature
- Thermostrat - pick subgame with widest hill at current temperature

Theorem: Thermostrat also optimal for Economist's rules

Observation: Thermostrat can exploit weaker opponents better than Sentestrat



Economic Forecasting

- Estimate value using mean, adjusting for first player using half of current temperature
- Refine estimate with each temperature drop
- Beneficial to make the last move at the higher temperature
- Estimates reasonable, error bounded by $t/2$



Conclusion

- Introduced concept of Komaster
- Extended thermographs to include basic kos
- Strategy to play optimally using thermographs (Economist rules)
- Ideas for more efficient construction of thermographs
- Refined estimates (forecasting)



Any Questions?